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Chinese aggression in the East and South China Sea has been a flash point for 
Pacific affairs since the 1960’s. As China’s economy increasingly needs oil and natural 
gas resources, how much of China’s aggression and/or claims in the area are due to the 
existence of oil and natural gas resources? This research identifies the theoretical 
background behind national strategy and energy strategy, and collects data about Chinese 
national strategy, the energy resource metrics (historical and present) specific to China 
and the East and South China Sea, and the evolution of the conflict in the area. Much 
research exists around these separate topics, in general and specifically focused on China. 
Identifying general national strategies, how countries execute those strategies, and the 
theories behind energy as a driver of national strategy will build a framework from which 
to review the current Chinese energy security situation and identify the effect this has on 
its strategy in the South and East China Seas. The results showed that while oil and 
natural gas may look like a main driver of the conflict, and may actually be a partial 
driver, Chinese national strategy does not align with the idea that oil and natural gas 
resources are the main driver for their aggression in the area. The identified economic 
and energy market metrics show that the resources gained by China claiming the South 
and East China Sea pales in comparison to their needs, the lack of progression in 
extraction of these energy resources shows the difficulty in extraction, and the conflict 
timeline dispute that energy is a driver. 
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Recently, the South and East China Seas have been identified as a flashpoint in 
the geopolitical sphere as an area that has become ever tumultuous. China has claimed 
the area based on historical rights dating back to the Xia dynasty (21st through 16th 
centuries BCE) and reaffirmed in the 1960’s.1 In general, the region that China claims is 
bound by a nine-dash line, covering what is currently the entire South China Seas bound 
on the west by Vietnam, the south by Malaysia and the east by the Philippines (see 
Appendix 1)2. In addition to these claims, China has claimed the area continental shelf off 
its coastline in the southernmost reaches of the East China Seas north of Taiwan, and area 
claimed by both Taiwan and Japan (see Appendix 2)3. China has set their sights on 
making further headway towards legitimizing their claims to these regions, an area that 
consists of mostly international waters and is contested on all sides by neighboring 
countries. Much has been written about the security implications for this activity, 
specifically with regards to the assumed Chinese strategy of regional dominance and 
Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) which would create a standoff area between threats 
and mainland China, and would increase the general influence of the Chinese government 
over the area. This paper will take a turn from the strict military aspect of this topic, and 
instead look at the implications and affects that energy has had on this conflict. More 
specifically, how has China’s need for increasing amounts of energy and their focus on 
 
1  Dingli, Shen, Elizabeth Economy, Richard Haass, Joshua Kurlantzick, Sheila A. Smith, and Simon Tay. 
2019. “China’s Martime Disputes.” Council on Foreign Relations. 2019. 
https://www.cfr.org/interactives/chinas-maritime-disputes?cid=otr-marketing_use-
china_sea_InfoGuide#!/chinas-maritime-disputes?cid=otr-marketing_use-china_sea_InfoGuide. 
2  CIA. 1988. “9 Dotted Line.” https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/ce/9_dotted_line.png. 




securing that energy from threats affected their strategy in the area? For this research, 
energy security will be defined as a country’s ability to access readily available and 
reliable energy resources at a volume and price that suits it’s economy’s requirements. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY, NATIONALISM VS. GLOBALIZATION 
Nationalism 
The well-regarded Anthony Smith identifies five different usages of the word. 
The first is focused on the, “process of formation, or growth, of nations4.” This definition 
or usage for the term is the most distinct from Smith’s the other four definitions because 
it is the only one that addresses nation formation. The second definition is “a sentiment or 
consciousness of belonging to the nation5,” which, while more similar to the final three 
definitions in that it is not necessarily about the formation of nations, it is a more 
theoretical notion than the others. A country’s population can feel a sentiment of 
collective consciousness without necessarily having any other traits of a solidified 
nationalistic country, and vice versa. The third involves, “language and symbolism of the 
nation6,” and the fourth references “a social and political movement on behalf of the 
nation7.” While important terms to consider when judging the nationalistic character of a 
country, these will not be the basis for considering the usage of the term with respect to 
this topic. Both of these references to nationalism focus on representation of the culture 
and the people, whereas the fifth and final usage for the term nationalism more closely 
ties to the thrust of this research. Smith’s final reference to nationalism is “a doctrine 
 
4  Smith, Anthony D. 2010. Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History. Polity., pg 17 
5  Smith 2010, pg 17 
6  Smith 2010, pg 17 
7  Smith 2010, pg 17 
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and/or ideology of the nation, both general and particular8.” While these other terms for 
nationalism are useful for studying the pervasiveness or character of a particular nation 
that may be nationalistic, here we will look at this final definition in order to understand 
the outward facing character of a nation, the way it has strategized and formed ideologies 
to project itself onto the world outside of the cultural influences or formational ideologies 
that surround a nation. Smith gives basic propositions of nationalism, of which we will 
focus on a few main points. These are: 
(1)the world is divided into nations, each with its own character, history and 
destiny; (2)the nation is the sole source of political power; (3)loyalty to the nation 
overrides all other loyalties; (4)to be free, every individual must belong to a 
nation; (5)every nation requires full self-expression and autonomy; (6)global 
peace and justice require a world of autonomous nations9. 
 
Because we are not dealing with a general dissection of the nationalistic character 
of a country, we will focus on those propositions that focus on the nation itself, rather 
than the individual. Specifically, we will look at propositions number one, two, three, and 
five. The degree to which number six fits into the research discussed here is debatable, 
but that is more or less outside the scope of the research. With these propositions 
identified, it is also understood that nationalistic nations often go against these 
propositions when it suits them, such as suppression of the first and therefore a 
contradiction with the sixth. The conflict of interest in these propositions comes when 
there is a conflict of interest between two countries, where one with power may subjugate 
the self-expression and autonomy of another in order to come to the ends that it deems 
necessary for its nation’s survival10. As Smith puts it: “In so doing, they have negated and 
 
8  Smith 2010, pg 18 
9  Smith 2010, pg 25 
10  Smith 2010, pg 26 
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subverted the core doctrine of nationalism, which emphasizes the finite character of 
nations and demands an explicit recognition of the existence, individuality and rights of 
other, analogous nations11.” 
Globalization 
In opposition to this nationalistic ideology is the idea of globalization and an ever 
more interconnected world. Joseph Nye Jr. speaks to the undoing of old international 
patterns where territorial states are no longer as important but instead international 
regimes are12. The idea of globalization typically focuses on “an increase in 
interconnections, or interdependence, a rise in transnational flows, and an intensification 
of processes such that the world is, in some respects, becoming a single place13” or the 
“compression of time and space14.” The first of these definitions focuses on the 
interconnectedness of countries and cross-border flows of people and goods. As William 
Tabb puts it, “Globalization refers to the process of reducing barriers between countries 
and encouraging closer economic, political, and social interaction15.” The second 
definition is more theoretical and speaks to the idea that because of our abilities to 
communicate, the geography that formerly stifled global transmission of social ideas and 
activity is becoming less of a burden and therefore “[s]pace is increasingly dislocated 
from place, and networked to other social contexts across the globe16.” In addition to 
geolocation, time horizons are also shortened, in both physical terms but also in social 
 
11  Smith 2010, pg 26 
12  Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph S. Nye. 1989. Interdependence in World Politics. Power and 
Interdependence. Second. Boston, MA: HarperCollins. 1989 
13  Mittelman, James H. 2000a. “Introduction.” In The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and 
Resistance, 2–14. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. https://muse.jhu.edu/book/33170., pg 5 
14  Mittelman 2000a, pg 5 
15  Tabb, William K. 1994. The Postwar Japanese System: Cultural Economy and Economic 
Transformation. New York: Oxford University Press., pg 1 
16  Mittelman 2000a, pg 6 
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terms17. This research will focus more on the first definition of the term globalization in 
that we will focus here on the expansion of global interconnectedness as strategy that a 
country may take as they move towards their strategic goals. 
Regionalism 
Regionalism stems from globalization but is generally a more focused theory that 
attempts to explain and predict the current evolving world that happens to be shifting 
towards globalization, but without the theoretical ends of creating a single unified state. It 
focuses on the concentration of economic and political power within a globalizing world. 
It initially came about from the development of regional currencies, then subsequent 
trading blocks, and has been given speed by deregulation and privatization18. These 
groups can develop through de facto group cooperative dynamics, via pacts and 
bilateral/multilateral formal cooperation, or through strategy driven approaches. Newer 
forms of regionalism are not necessarily driven by polar hegemonies, but, because of the 
readily available means of communications and transportation, are instead mostly driven 
by spontaneous collections of smaller states or “springing from within and below19. 
Regionalism also includes theories that place the blame for disintegration on the 
protectionism that can stem from regional dominance of a single trading block or group 
of cooperative parties. This would promote exclusion centered around, and based on the 
general strategy of the most powerful party in the cooperative landscape20. This “does 
identify the contradictory nature of regionalism, which is both an integrative and 
disintegrative process, partly the result of the interplay among variants of this 
 
17  Mittelman 2000a, pg 6 
18  Mittelman 2000b, pg 112 
19  Mittelman 2000b, pg 113 
20  Mittelman 2000b, pg 114 
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phenomenon in different zones of the global political economy21.” To identify a 
regionalism trend, one should look for this stabilizing and destabilizing nature of the 
theory along with some unifying set of values upon which to justify these activities22. 
Globalization increases under these situations, but only to a certain point. 
POWER PROJECTION, HARD POWER VS. SOFT POWER 
Both hard power and soft power have their place in the world of national strategy. 
Hard power, as Gilboa states, is the use of military and economic means to influence the 
national strategic goals of a nation23. Clausewitz is famous for stating that war is “the 
continuation of policy by other means24.” Military power includes the use of seapower, 
landpower, airpower, and nuclear power for both coercion and deterrence. Modern 
definitions also include “irregular war, insurgencies, counterinsurgencies, new war, and 
hybrid war25.” Economic power is the use of a country’s economic means and influences 
to induce or coerce other forces to align with national strategy and policies. It includes 
both private, public, and government owned economic resources in concert with general 
national strategy. The use of hard power comes to the fore when a country must act 
outside of the ‘norms’ of diplomacy to forcefully influence other parties. As mentioned, 
military hard power includes behaviors like coercion and deterrence using the resources 
of a country via force and threats. The policies which implement this type of military 
hard power are coercive diplomacy, war, and alliances alike. Economic hard power 
 
21  Mittelman 2000b, pg 114 
22  Mittelman 2000b, pg 128 
23  Gilboa, Eytan. 2008. “Searching for a Theory of Public Diplomacy.” The Annals of the American 
Academy, 55–77. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0002716207312142. 
24  Sloan, Elinor C. 2017. Modern Military Strategy. Second. New York, NY: Routledge. 
, pg 1) 
25  Sloan 2017, pg 1 
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includes behaviors like inducement and coercion, but through sanctions and payments to, 
from, and between those economic entities that are willing to support the national 
strategy of a country. These policies include aid and bribes26. Hard power can be 
measured in net trade calculations, sanctions, ships, soldiers, and/or the outcome of 
military activity. Most hard power is measured in tangible things like currency or an asset 
“you can drop it on a city or on your foot27.” Joseph Nye Jr. claims that “one can affect 
others’ behavior in three main ways: threats of coercion (“sticks”), inducements and 
payments (“carrots”), and attraction that makes others want what you want28.” Hard 
power covers the ‘sticks’ and the ‘carrots,’ and is generally seen as the opposite of soft 
power. 
Soft power covers those activities that make others want what you want. It is most 
effectively used when others “want to follow [your country], admiring its values, 
emulating its example, and/or aspiring to its level of prosperity and openness29.” Soft 
power requires an agenda or strategy that is attractive to others in diplomatic settings, and 
ranges from the smallest influences and interactions in society and the media to the 
broadest governmental policies. It is the mainstay of politics and diplomacy, covering 
interactions like persuasion and attraction30. Soft power includes behaviors like agenda-
setting and cooptation of ideas and ideologies using resources like values, culture, 
politics, and institutions. Government policies that implement soft power are public 
 
26  Gilboa 2008 
27  Nye Jr., Joseph S. 2008. “Public Diplomacy and Soft Power.” The Annals of the American Academy, 
94–109. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0002716207311699. 
28  Nye Jr. 2008 
29  Nye Jr. 2008 
30  Nye Jr. 2008 
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diplomacy, and in both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy31. While hard power is much 
easier to measure, soft power can also be measured via polls and focus groups. The 
judgement of whether or not is was, in fact, the soft power that produced such outcomes 
must be determined on a case-by-case basis, but can nonetheless be measured32. In either 
case, the measurement will not necessarily properly predict the outcomes, correlation 
does not always equate to causation, and predictions based on the past are not always a 
guarantee of the future. Soft power is intricate and covers a diverse set of timelines. A 
good framework for analysis comes from Eytan Gilboa who breaks the timeline up into 
immediate, intermediate, and long-range soft power. Immediate soft power is reactive 
and happens in a matter of days or hours. It’s closely linked to governments and news 
management and includes advocacy, international broadcasting, and cyber public 
diplomacy. Intermediate soft power happens on the scale of weeks and months and is 
proactive in purpose. It usually is partially linked to government through general strategic 
communications like international public relations, corporate diplomacy, or diaspora 
public diplomacy. Long term soft power occurs on the scale of years. Its purpose is to 
build relationships and build favorable conditions through cultural diplomacy, exchanges, 
and branding. This long term soft power projection is mostly remotely linked to 
governments, although there are some examples of heavily intertwined long term soft 




31  Gilboa 2008 
32  Nye Jr. 2008 
33  Gilboa 2008 
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GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY 
On the geopolitics of energy, Robert Kaplan of Stratfor Global Intelligence states, 
“Just as there are military geopolitics, diplomatic geopolitics and economic geopolitics, 
there is also energy geopolitics. For natural resources and the trade routes that bring those 
resources to consumers is central to the study of geography. Every international order in 
early modern and modern history is based on an energy resource34.” Because of the 
increasing usage of energy resources by every nation on earth, the topic is now a security 
issue. Both importers and exporters seek to secure the affordability, supply, 
transportation, and extraction of these resources. Importers need to guarantee the 
affordability and supply, while exporters need to guarantee that they will be able to meet 
demand, deliver the product, and obtain a fair market value for those goods. All parties 
are concerned with the transportation vulnerabilities that exist and the vulnerabilities that 
exist with respect to the infrastructure necessary for exploration, extraction, and 
processing35. As energy becomes more of a global security issue, strategists need to think 
more about the needs of the exporting countries along with the needs of the newly 
importing countries as well, not just the needs of those major powers who historically 
have been the main importers and supporters of the global energy market36. With an ever 
increasing need for oil resources and a declining amount of space in the extraction 
geography, no longer can we focus our attention on the security of delivery to the 
importers of old, but need to shift our security focus to the production and export along 
 
34  Kaplan, Robert D. 2014. “The Geopolitics of Energy.” Stratfor Global Intelligence. 2014. 
http://www.ctcitraining.org/topdocs/GeopoliticsEnergy.pdf. 
35  Bradshaw, Michael J. 2009. “The Geopolitics of Global Energy Security.” Geography Compass 3 (5): 
1920–37., pg 1926 
36  Bradshaw 2009, pg 1933 
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with those new players in the import market that may cause shifts in stability. Energy is 
the focus of every facet of grand strategy, it may be the ends but also the means37. It can 
guide the “political, military, diplomatic, and economic strategies created by leaders who 
seek to provide secure energy resources at reasonable prices to their economies and 
constituents38.” But it can also be the means by which countries can execute their grand 
strategy, helping them to achieve their goals that are non-energy focused. This can occur 
in two ways, through the energy production or energy demand that they provide to the 
world, using this as a tool to influence other parties, or as a sources of revenue which 
may allow them to pursue international strategies or domestic policies to implement their 
grand strategy39. Although it is not the focus of this research, energy’s effect on the 
environment and a country’s development and research into alternative energies also 
drives grand strategy. These factors may increase in magnitude as the overall supply of 
traditional energy resources becomes less available, but this is outside the scope of this 
research40. 
With respect to the logic of war, energy plays a major role in two general ways. 
The first is the idea that energy is needed in order to execute war. This includes the 
ability to have energy resources in supply but also available to be useful for military use. 
The second thread of research is on the idea that energy is something to fight wars 
over.41. In addition to fighting wars specifically over energy resources, the secondary 
 
37  O’Sullivan, Mehan L. 2013. “The Handbook of Global Energy Policy.” In The Handbook of Global 
Energy Policy, edited by Andreas Goldthau, 30–47. West Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell. pg 42 
38  O’Sullivan 2013, pg 42 
39  O’Sullivan 2013 
40  O’Sullivan 2013, pg 42 
41  Ciuta, Felix. 2010. “Conceptual Notes on Energy Security: Total or Banal Security?” Security Dialogue 
41 (2): 123–44. https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/0967010610361596. 
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effects of energy starvation and scarcity can be a flashpoint for “socio-economic, political 
and environmental conditions such as population movements, internal strife, 
secessionism, and desertification, which cause or accelerate both interstate and intrastate 
conflict42.” 
Alternatively to this logic of war, is Felix Ciuta’s Logic of Subsistence whereby 
everyone needs energy, and therefore energy security is not necessarily a means, tool, or 
end of warfare or grand strategy, but a final goal of public policy. In this logic, energy is 
not necessarily a tool that allows a state to better achieve their goals, but it is a 
commodity that must be guaranteed in order to stave off dysfunction within a state43. 
LITERATURE REVIEW SUMMARY 
Countries can press for multiple general grand strategies while employing various 
types of power projection to gain ground towards those strategies. Here, the research has 
identified nationalism, globalization, and regionalism as three of the major types of grand 
strategies that countries can emphasize as their nation progresses forward. In the efforts 
to execute these strategies, the research points to hard and soft power as effectors. The 
geopolitics of energy play a major role in grand strategy development and execution. The 
goals of a country’s grand strategy can be guided and/or informed by their need for 
energy resources, as mentioned above. While these issues have not been found wanting 
for research specific to China’s strategy, what the author has not been able to find is 
what, if any, shift has occurred as a response to the oil situation in the South and East 
China Sea. Many scholars have identified general Chinese strategy and how that strategy 
has progressed over time, and many have identified that China has become ever 
 
42  Ciuta 2010, pg 129 
43  Ciuta 2010 pg 132 
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aggressive in the area over energy security or for other reasons. What is missing, and 
what this research hopes to achieve, is a determination of the likelihood of the South and 
East China Sea conflict evolution being the main driver of China’s strategy in the area. 
METHODS 
My hypothesis is that the drive for energy security informs China’s strategy in the 
South and East China Seas and is a major reason for their aggression in the area. The null 
hypothesis can be proven true if my research shows that China’s strategy has not 
generally changed in correlation with South and East China Seas’ energy activities in the 
area, or if the scale of these energy activities is such that they wouldn’t have much of a 
net effect on China’s energy security. The null can be rejected if China’s general strategy 
in the area has evolved in correlation with energy activities and those energy activities are 
of a scale that would secure significant energy security for China. My attempt to answer 
or inform this question will revolve around identifying the Chinese strategy, both specific 
to the region and in a grand scheme, and identify pertinent oil and natural gas data in 
correlation with any change in strategy. Identifying the scale of China’s focus on energy 
resources, the resources used and/or available, and the timeline of events in the South and 
East China Seas should shed some light on the impact that the physical presence of 
energy resources has on their activities in the area. 
To determine how possible energy reserves has affected the Chinese 
government’s strategy vis-à-vis the South and East China Sea, I will first identify the 
frameworks within which I will complete my analysis. I discussed the notion of 
nationalism vs. globalization vs. regionalism. This will allow me to identify typical 
aspects of those theories that would help to identify the ideology behind the Chinese 
13 
 
strategy. Seeing as the South and East China Seas conflict typically discusses China’s 
expansion pressure, generalizing their strategy into one of these three camps and then 
identifying which of the three strategies China is taking will help point to their intentions. 
I then discussed the role that energy plays in general strategy thinking. This portion 
reviewed some of the ideas around energy as the ends, tools, and/or means to general 
strategy but also looked at the competing theories of energy strategy focused on warfare, 
energy strategy as a logic of subsistence, and energy security as a necessary commodity 
that needs to be provided for stability. This will also help to identify China’s intentions 
when it comes to their grand strategy and how they see energy security.  
The data I will collect surrounds the hard and soft power projected by the Chinese 
government in an attempt to gain insight into the strategy that China has taken in the 
South and East China Seas and in general towards their national strategy. I will also look 
at oil and natural gas data related to China (including consumption, production, imports, 
exports, transportation, reserves) and related to the reserves in the East and South China 
Seas. After detailing the energy movement and access in the area, I will break down the 
pertinent activities within the South and East China Seas that relate to claimed Chinese 
aggression in the area in order to understand the evolution of the conflicts. Using this 
information, I will make educated claims about what influence those energy resources are 
likely to have had in the conflict. 
DATA 
CHINA’S HARD POWER 
China has put developed a national strategy that attempts to project more soft and 
hard power, per their activities and their stated strategy. While they have grown notably 
14 
 
in their use of hard power, the resurgence of their attempts at soft power have become 
evident but has not necessarily matched the increases they have made in their economic 
and military growth44. Specifically, China’s increased naval strategy and force structure 
are key. The strategy is one that has shifted from a green water navy to that of an 
expanding blue water navy45. During a 2013 interview from Lieutenant Commander Shi 
Lei after returning from an escort mission to the Gulf of Aden, he mentioned that when 
joining the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) a decade earlier, he never thought he 
would sail far from land46. United States Naval Captain James E Fanell summarizes their 
strategy by saying, 
The PLAN is China’s point of the spear in its quest for global hegemony… 
China’s increasingly well-publicized naval presence and operations throughout 
Southeast Asia have contributed to a tectonic shift in this sensitive region, a shift 
towards Beijing and authoritarianism and away from the United States and its 
values of democracy and the rule of law47. 
 
The expansion and modernization has occurred through military and command 
reorganization and materiel expansion. In the year 2000, China had less than 50 advanced 
fighter/strike aircraft, 15 surface ships, four submarines, and only 300 ballistic missiles. 
By 2015, China had expanded its military to include more than 720 advanced 
fighter/strike aircraft, 65 surface ships, 60 submarines, and over 1000 ballistic missiles48. 
 
44  Wang, Jian. 2011. Soft Power in China: Public Diplomacy Through Communication. New York, NY: 
Pulgrave Macmillan. https://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/jhu/reader.action?docID=652664&ppg=18., pg 
5 
45  According to the US Naval Operations Concept of 2010, “blue water refers to open ocean; green water 
refers to coastal waters, ports and harbors; and brown water refers to navigable rivers and their estuaries 
(“Naval Operations Concept 2010: Implementing the Maritime Strategy” 2010, Washington, DC)” 
46  Fanell, James E. 2019. “China’s Global Naval Strategy and Expanding Force Structure.” Naval War 
College Review 72 (1): 10–55. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26607110.pdf?ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_SYC-4693%2Ftest., pg 14 
47  Fanell 2019, pg 14 
48  O’Rourke, Ronald. 2019. “China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—
Background and Issues for Congress.” Washington, DC. 
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The general strategy has shifted from a coastal naval force that only operates within 50 
miles of the Chinese coastline to a naval force that has expanded into the Pacific and 
further when needed. No longer is the PLAN made up of single mission platforms, but 
flexible, multi-mission platforms that are suited for new types of combat that include 
expanding missions outside the coastlines and the South and East China Seas49. These 
platforms are suited to take islands and can provide more than adequate gunfire support 
for amphibious landing forces5051. Most notably, this force structure and expansion has 
allowed the Chinese to present significant roadblocks to those that wish to use hard 
power pressure against it. Specifically, the PLAN expansion has allowed China to 
execute an Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2AD) strategy that present off-limit areas and 
sanctuaries in the far western regions of the Pacific like the East and South China Seas52. 
Anti-access prevents any threat from setting up land bases in the area, while area denial 
prevents any freedom of navigation for civilians and maritime military forces, based on 
the decisions of the Chinese government and military53. In addition to the increased size, 
ability, and revitalized organization, China possesses specific A2/AD capabilities based 
on their tactics and location. The Chinese government and military have positioned the 
preponderance of its military might in and/or near the East and South China Seas for 
quick deployment in the case of aggression or the necessity to execute operations. In 
addition, the military has claimed, built up, and fortified island chains within the Seas, 
 
49  Fanell 2019, pg 17 
50  Yoshihara, Toshi, and James R. Holmes. 2017. “Taking Stock of China’s Growing Navy: The Dealth 
and Life of Surface Fleets.” Philadelphia, PA) 
51  Fanell 2019 
52  Bitzinger, Richard A. 2016. “Third Offset Strategy and Chinese A2/AD Capabilities.” Center for a New 
American Security. https://www-jstor-
org.proxy1.library.jhu.edu/stable/pdf/resrep06122.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Aadf307084579d641799cee36
1239c4d3., pg 2 
53  Bitzinger 2016, pg 2 
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specifically Woody Island in the Parcel Island chain and former reefs in the Spratlys. 
Runways are being created on three other islands in addition to a 3000-meter airstrip on 
the aforementioned Spratly artificial island54. In addition, the PLAN receive support from 
“the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia (PAFMM) ships and the largest civilian 
fishing fleets on the planet55.” The Chinese government has increased their hard power 
projection by increasing the size of their forces and shifting the organization of the forces 
to expand their influence and reach. 
CHINA’S SOFT POWER 
Chinese leadership now pursues a soft power that is equal to its hard power, and 
has attempted to do this through the use of institutions and a rebranding of Chinese soft 
power. Official institutions like the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 
Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 
ASEAN’s upcoming Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), and non-
official or semi-official institutions like the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council and 
Pacific Trade and Development (PAFTAD) institution have all been key in the rise of 
China and the ability for China to distinguish itself as a Pacific leader and project soft 
power in the region56. This has been especially key for the Chinese government, 
especially with the uncertainty brought about by the ‘America First’ ideology of the 
Trump Administration. In addition to the use of institutions to build soft power, China 
has attempted to rebrand their soft power and rely more heavily on their cultural soft 
power. This was officially named a key national initiative at the Seventeenth National 
 
54  Bitzinger 2016, pg 3 and 4 
55  Fanell 2019, pg 18 




Congress of the Chinese Community Party in 2007 and has been a focus for Chinese soft 
power ever since. The usage of soft power is therefore applied to international relations 
and domestic policies alike in order to bring them into concert together57. The 
collaboration between the two includes bringing Chinese arts, culture, media, 
entertainment, publishing, and language learning abroad. China is now pressing to, in the 
words of Fu Ying, the former Chinese ambassador to the United Kingdom, “take the 
initiative to conduct public diplomacy to help the outside world know about China58.” 
This initiative includes shifting the communications strategy to be, “close to Chinese 
realities, close to the information needs of foreign audiences, and close to their 
information habits and minds59.” 
Chinese soft power increases have fallen prey to three distinct challenges. The 
first is the divergence from what China hopes to project upon the world against what the 
world actually sees of them. In a 2009 report from the BBC World Service, 92 percent of 
Chinese viewed their influence in the world in a positive light, whereas the number of 
other countries that viewed China in a negative light increased (although many 
developing Latin American and African countries did view China in a positive light)60. In 
addition, in light of the Beijing Olympics, almost three quarters of Chinese viewed their 
country as one that was greatly liked abroad, while other countries has dissimilar ideas 
about China61. The second challenge that China has faced in their attempt to gain soft 
power is the split between the general image that the politicians present and the image 
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that society projects. In research findings, the society of China, including traditions and 
culture, has been shown to have a positive reaction from outside countries while the 
government and it’s policies have a much lower standing in the world. Specifically, in a 
2008 Chicago Council of Global Affairs survey, the overall soft power of China 
(including political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and human capital) ranked below that 
of the United States, but the cultural soft power responses, especially in Southeast Asia 
were much higher62. The third challenge that the Chinese government has faced in 
projecting soft power is the pattern of perception between Americans and Chinese on the 
opposing government. The Chicago Council survey mentioned above showed that 
Chinese citizens mostly view the United States in a positive light (61 on a scale of 100) 
whereas American citizens mostly view China in a negative light (35 on a scale of 100). 
This pattern has continued for decades, 
Among all the world’s countries, China probably cares the most about its image in 
the United States. According to the favorability tracking polls by Gallup over the 
last two decades, except for a few isolated time periods, the proportion of 
Americans holding positive views of China hovers around 40 percent, whereas 
those with unfavorable perceptions is about 50 percent63. 
 
The general consensus around China’s soft power and the opinion of many 
western researchers shows three general ideologies around China’s attempt at projecting 
soft power, the first is a threat, the second is a collapse, and the third is neo-colonialism, 
with the idea of China as a threat being the most prevalent. All three perspectives show 
China’s growth and projection of power in a negative light within research spheres64. As 
Wang puts it, “According to these interpretations, the “rising” of China challenges and 
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destabilizes the existing international structure in the realms of security and economy as 
well as along the lines of soft power65.” 
OIL AND GAS IN CHINA 
Energy Sector Summary 
According to China’s 13th Five Year Plan, the government is pushing to increase 
domestic energy security in the hopes of building up infrastructure and becoming self-
sufficient by exploring for oil and oil products domestically and decreasing imports66. 
The market in China, specifically for oil and gas, is dominated by three national oil 
companies (NOC): Sinopec, China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), and China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) which handle most upstream and 
downstream67 elements68. Woods McKenzie, an energy research and consultancy 
company, estimates that only 2-5% of China’s oil and gas production is done by 
international oil companies (IOCs), and mostly only through partnering with NOCs69. In 
addition to this government led thrust for up and downstream oil production, the Chinese 
government has recently announced plans to take control of all pipelines owned or 
operated by these NOCs under a single national pipeline company70. This in the hopes of 
increasing private investments and increasing a prioritized focus on infrastructure 
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development for oil transportation71. China’s energy sector, at the guidance of the 
government, has been largely attempting to move towards self-sufficiency as the country 
increases its economy at such a high rate. Even with this increase in pressure to move 
toward self-sufficiency, the challenging geology of China is a hindrance72. In addition, 
the oil fields that have historically been the most prolific are mature and are already at 
peak production. Companies have focused on sustaining these oil flows with 
technological investments and have started to look towards developing reserves in the 
western provinces and offshore73. While the Chinese government owned NOCs do handle 
almost all of the upstream and downstream sectors for oil and natural gas, the 
technological challenges to exploration of offshore deepwater fields and the extraction of 
those products has led to the Chinese government granting some international companies 
access in order to speed the technological advancement process74. Even with this increase 
in oil exploration, technological advances, and a strategy to decrease imports, China has 
increased its reliance on imports, of which oil rose to almost 70% in 201875. 
China’s general political strategy has been threefold, first is importing oil from 
pariah states, second is focusing on a “no global” strategy for the NOC’s, and third is 
using the financial resources of the Chinese government to support the NOCs. Now that 
the Chinese oil and natural gas sectors and more centralized than the late 1990’s and 
early 2000’s this strategy for energy security has been much more successful. In this 
time, China’s consumption rose almost 20%, but the production of oil from OPEC 
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countries barely rose because of this, showing China’s diverse strategy76 In addition, the 
central party has pressed the NOCs to operate as independently from other country’s 
help, and focused on securing oil pipelines and shipping routes 77 
Consumption 
Chinese oil usage has increased significantly over the past twenty years and 
correlates with their increased economy and increased GDP78. As of 2016, China ranks 
first in both total primary energy production at 108.999 quadrillion Btu and total primary 
energy consumption at 141.079 quadrillion Btu79. China ranks second in oil consumption 
with 12.792 million barrels of oil consumed daily, only behind the United States at 
19.687 million barrels of oil per day, according to the U.S. Energy Information Agency80. 
It has steadily increased its consumption every year since 1982 when the country 
consumed only 2 million barrels of oil per day81. Oil’s share of total energy consumed has 
increased from around 8% in 1965 to close to 19% in 201582. 
China ranks third in natural gas consumption at 8.426 trillion cubic feet of natural 
gas consumed in 2017, behind the United States and Russia, respectively83. In recent 
years, China has set its sights on natural gas as one of the major energy supplies for the 
future, so much so that the country’s increasing use of natural gas in the ‘Blue Skies’ 
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policy that drives toward air quality is predicted to account for one third of the global 
demand increase by 2022. In addition, the 13th Five Year Plan projects that natural gas 
will rise from 3% to 10% of the country’s energy mix by 20208485. 
Production 
China is the fifth largest oil producer as of 201786. In 2018, China produced 4.81 
million barrels of oil per day according to the U.S. Energy Information Agency, up from 
4.16 in 2008, 3.30 in 1998, and 2.72 in 198887. China’s energy production has generally 
increased since bottoming out around 2 million barrels of oil per day in 1982, but has 
slowed in the past three years88. 
China ranks sixth in natural gas production with 5.125 trillion cubic feet in 201789. 
China’s natural gas production from 1980 through the mid to late 1990’s stayed relatively 
stable, hovering around 10% of current production levels, increased steadily from the mid 
to late 1990’s through mid-2000’s, and then tripled from 2005 to 201890. 
Imports 
As of 2016 and based on their judgement of the necessary amount of data to rank 
countries, the U.S. Energy Information Agency tallied China’s crude oil imports 
including lease condensate91 at 7.621 million barrels of oil per day, ranking second only 
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to the United States92. According to the International Energy Administration, China 
recently passed the United States in 2017 in total crude oil imports93. The increased 
imports trend continued as China’s Customs statistics stated that crude oil imports rose 
more than 10% in 2018, setting a record at 9.24 million barrels of oil imported per day94. 
These numbers represent significant amounts of Chinese oil consumption, estimated in 
2015 at 61% imported, and almost 70% in 201895.China became a crude oil importer in 
the early nineties, and has increased oil imports every year except for 1998 and 200196. 
With respect to natural gas, China imported 3.448 trillion cubic feet of natural gas 
in 2017, leaving China ranked number three behind the Germany and Japan, 
respectively97. The level of imports has increased dramatically since 2005 when China 
imported close to zero natural gas98. From 2017 to 2018, China increased its natural gas 
imports by almost 32%, and indications show that this accounts for more than 45% of 
China’s natural gas demand99. 
Exports 
China exports 59 thousand barrels of oil per day, as of 2016, the most recent year 
for which the U.S. Energy Information Agency gives estimates. This ranks 40th overall in 
the world. China exported 119 billion cubic feet of natural gas in 2017, ranking it 35th 
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overall100. In general, China’s exports of crude oil have decreased from a high in 1985 
when they exported over 600 thousand barrels of oil101. 
Reserves 
The natural reserves of China currently are estimated at 26 billion barrels of oil as 
of 2018, and 208 trillion cubic feet of natural gas102. The CIA’s estimates are slightly 
different but align, showing 25.63 billion barrels of oil in proven reserves as of 2018, and 
about 192 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in proven reserves103. China has 400 to 500 
million barrels of reserve oil held for strategic usage104. According to the Chinese 
National Energy Administration (NEA)105, the combination of strategic petroleum 
reserves, oil farm storage, and commercial stock can support the Chinese economy for an 
estimated 80 days, around 788 million barrels in total106 
Transportation 
About 80% of Chinese oil flows through the South China Sea via the Straits of 
Malacca107. In addition to this, China obtains oil through various pipelines from Russia 
and through pipelines in the western portion of the country108. Russian imports to China 
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account for around 13% of China’s overall oil imports109110. In addition to currently 
existing imports from Russia and via the South China Sea, the government of China is 
working to develop a pipeline that would run from the port of Gwadar, Pakistan to 
Kashgar, China, spanning more than 1300 miles over difficult terrain and contested 
borders in the Kashmir region111112, and began operating a pipeline through more than 
700km of Myanmar in 2014113. 
SOUTH AND EAST CHINA SEA OIL 
The South and East China Seas contains both crude oil resources and natural gas 
resources, proven, probable, and unproven. The estimates for the amount of oil that is 
extractable varies drastically based on the estimation techniques and the assumptions 
placed by each estimator. The U.S. Energy Information Agency predicts 11 billion 
barrels of oil reserves and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas reserves. In contrast, 
Wood Mackenzie estimates 2.5 billion barrels of oil equivalent of combined resources 
under the sea114. Chinese government estimates claim 213 billion barrels, and the US 
Geological Survey estimates between five and 22 billion barrels of oil and between 70 
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and 290 trillion cubic feet of gas in undiscovered resources115116. These estimates are not 
on the scale needed for Chinese long term oil and natural gas independence, based on 
their imports and consumption, but it does represent a significant increase in the 
country’s reserves. 
Many of these reserves exist in contested waters along the eastern coast of 
Vietnam and the western coast of the Philippines, both areas that are contested by 
China’s claim to the nine-dash line. About 80 parcels of possible undersea stores of oil 
exist in the area, around 30 of which are fully or partially claimed by China. About 28 of 
these are in waters claimed by both China and Vietnam, and while China has not 
officially claimed the parcels near the Philippines, they do lie within the nine-dash line 
and are in the vicinity of the Chinese claimed Spratly Islands (see Appendix 3) 117. The 
areas around the Spratly Islands is estimated, by the USGS, to contain 2.5 billion barrels 
of oil and 25.5 trillion cubic feet of undiscovered resources. These areas on the northeast 
end of the Spratlys, called the Reed Bank, is claimed by China Taiwan, and Vietnam. In 
addition to the contested claims to the area, the Philippines discovered natural gas in 
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SOUTH AND EAST CHINA SEA DISPUTE EVOLUTION 
Below is a brief timeline of significant events that have occurred in the South 
China Seas for contextualizing the South and East China Sea conflict and interest in oil in 
the region119. Towards the end of World War II (WWII), China made their first claim to 
the area then known as the eleven-dash line. This area covered the Pratas Islands, the 
Macclesfield Bank, and the Paracel and Spratly Islands and included the Gulf of 
Tonkin120. Soon after the Treaty of Peace was signed between Japan and forty-eight 
countries, ending WWII, Japan conceded its claims to the South China Sea, to which they 
were granted residual sovereignty over. In 1960, Japan’s sovereignty claims begin to 
come into effect, and the US and Japan signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security, covering the South China Sea Islands and Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands in the East 
China Sea. Nine years later, in 1969, the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far 
East publishes a report identifying credible findings of hydrocarbon resources between 
Taiwan and Japan, the first of its kind in the area. In response to this, Japan, South Korea, 
and Taiwan hold East China Sea energy exploration talks, while China reiterates claims 
sovereignty over nine-dash line, specifically the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. This situation 
begins a long history of aggression by China in the area that is matched, somewhat, by 
neighbors to the Seas who claim the very same islands and includes hostile takeovers, 
crashes (naval vessels and aircraft and civilian vessels), island building, the taking of 
captives, purchasing of privately owned islands in the area, and unilateral signing of laws 
laying claim to the area (See Appendix 4 for more details). During these competing claim 
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battles, the 1982 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines 
the usage of a nation’s surrounding waters based on exclusive economic zones and 
continental shelves, but it is vague with respect to the South and East China Seas and has 
still not been ratified. To complicate matters, China passed the Law on the Territorial Sea 
and the Contiguous Zone in 1992, laying claim to all of the South China Sea based on 
claims dating back to the Xia dynasty (21st through 16th centuries BCE). In 2002 the 
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea was signed between the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and China creating guidelines for 
conflict resolution in the area. Although both UNCLOS and the Declaration of the 
Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea existed, China, in 2009, began to develop the 
Tianwaitian/Kashi oil field, and area that was set aside for joint development between 
China and Japan. As time progressed, China slowly began militarizing the area, to the 
point that, in 2013, the Philippines finally initiated an international arbitration case under 
UNCLOS regarding the Chinese claims over the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal. 
Because China rejected the process, UNCLOS arbitrated without Chinese participation 
and, in 2016, the Hague ruled against China and stated that they have no legal basis for 
the South China Sea historical claims, a ruling that China neither accepts nor recognizes. 
Competition continues to this day in various forms mostly upholding UNCLOS rulings 
but leaning towards Chinese dominance because of their military might. Appendix 4 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The data provided here show a transformation of Chinese power that includes 
developments in both the military/defense and oil industries, along with a general push 
towards more power projection and aggression in the East and South China Sea. The 
significant increase in economic might has driven an increase in oil consumption beyond 
what China can provide for the economy. Since the early 1990’s, China has imported oil 
to meet their energy demands, growing to become the top oil importer in the world122. In 
addition, China became a natural gas importer around 2005, and has significantly 
increased their usage of natural gas, leading to a year to year increase of over 30% 
between 2017 and 2018123124. During the time between 1990 and 2018, China’s economy 
grew at an average rate above 9%, bringing it from $360 billion to $13,608 billion125126. 
Continual increases in economic metrics like this rely heavily on the ability for China to 
obtain energy resources. In addition to economic development and increases in soft and 
hard power, the Chinese government has also started to develop economic infrastructure 
to support their growing trade. This includes long-term port deals in “Australia, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Myanmar, the Strait of Malacca, Bangladesh, Sri 
Lanka, Pakistan, Djibouti, Tanzania, Mauritius, Namibia, and Greece127” and negotiations 
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with Maldives, Scandinavia, and Greenland for additional ports128. These ports support 
the commercial side of Chinese trade, but also PLAN vessels and Chinese merchant 
marine vessels (which are required to now be built to military specifications as of 
2015)129. The Chinese government has self-proclaimed that they are pushing for increased 
soft power, but have made more strides towards hard power projection. This is most 
evident by the Chinese activities in the South and East China Sea and because of the 
timeline for oil discovery and exploration in the area, could cause observers to believe 
that the projection in the area is based on claims for these resources. When identifying the 
significant activities in the area, very little extraction has happened in contested waters130. 
While China has an ever-growing need for oil and natural gas resources to support their 
economy and increasing military, the sheer size of the possible oil resources under the 
East and South China seas are not a viable option to give China oil independence. While 
the resources under the sea are not significant enough to give China oil and natural gas 
independence, it would account for a significant increase in overall reserves for the 
country. The BRI focuses on the continued interconnectedness of the energy resources 
flowing through and into Asia, but is oddly quiet about the specific resources under the 
East and South China Sea131. The aggressive Chinese activities in the area did spark after 
the UN determined there were resources under the sea, but China has not changed its 
overarching national strategy to claim that area specifically for solely the oil and natural 
gas resources. Hypothetically, if securing the energy reserves under the East and South 
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China Sea was a significant pillar of the Chinese strategy in the area, then energy 
concerns would predate their claim to the nine dash line. In this case, while their activity 
did increase after the UN determination, their activity in the area was initially based on 
historical claims in a time when they were not significantly concerned with securing 
future energy resources. 
The activity of the Chinese government in the area is more akin to a regionalism 
approach, based on the economic growth and general disregard for neighboring country’s 
claims to areas that are in contestation but not necessarily succeeding at pressing their 
military claims much outside of the South and East China Seas. While securing energy 
resources are necessary for this strategy, Chinese consumption, at 12.792 billion barrels 
per day in 2017, would use up the entirety of the oil resources in in the area less than two 
and a half years, and would consume the natural gas resources even faster132133. Therefore 
it is unlikely that their activity in the area is focused on extracting these resources. It 
seems that China’s ideals lead them towards a national strategy focused on the developed 
use of soft power, but as the research shows, this strategy has only worked in neighboring 
regions, therefore showing a regionalism strategy. This soft power approach has lagged 
behind their ability to project hard power, and their aggression and activities in the South 
and East China Seas are a testament to that, and a testament to their growing regionalism 
approach. Specifically in the South and East China Sea, this hard power is used to secure 
the energy resources there, but because of the scale of consumption, need for imports, 
and scale of resources under the South and East China Seas, using energy security as a 
rationale to fight for the area is most likely only a guise. 
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ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
One explanation for the Chinese strategy in the area is the idea that the expansion 
into the South and East China Seas is a strategy that will allow China to affect the trade 
routes and economics of many world powers across the globe. According to CSIS, $3.37 
trillion of trade transited the area in 2016. This, compared to overall world trade in 2016 
at $15.9 trillion, accounts for a full 21% of all world trade. Some estimates even predict 
the amount of trade at $5.3 trillion that transits the area annually, increasing the 
percentage to a full third of all global trade134. If China were to have pure hegemony 
aspirations, using the energy resources under the East and South China Seas as a guise for 
control of the region would predictably be a strategy that would help. 
Another explanation for China’s aggression in the area is not that they need to 
obtain more access to energy resources, but that they need to protect the energy resources 
that transit the area. By 2030, it is predicted that 80% of crude oil used by China will be 
imported135, and seeing as much of that is shipped through the South China Sea, it is more 
likely that the hard power projection is to secure those shipping lanes rather than extract 
the natural resources from the ocean floor. The predicted A2AD strategy allows China to 
create a standoff area between these shipping lanes (and their homeland) and those that 
wish to oppose them, most notably the United States. 
As this research only covered oil and natural gas, a full identification of all energy 
resources is necessary to truly understand energy’s role in China’s South and East China 
Seas strategy. The country has been pushing towards ever more sustainable energy 
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resources, as is apparent in their national strategy and their development projects136. 
Instead of relying on the reserves in the South and East China Seas, China may be 
heading towards energy sustainability and security via the renewables route in order to 
offset their need to secure traditional oil and natural gas imports. 
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APPENDIX 1: Map of South China Sea with 9 Dash Line 
 
A map of the South China Sea with the 9 dotted (or 9 dash) line highlighted in 
green137  
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APPENDIX 2: Map of South China Sea and southern East China Sea 
 
A map of the South China and southern East China Sea with identified conflict 
areas and location of national claims138  
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APPENDIX 3: Map of oil licensing blocks in the South China Sea 
 
The South China Sea with licensing blocks and claim lines identified by color, the 
black line identifies the Philippine continental shelf: 
China’s blocks and claim lines are identified in blue 
Vietnam’s blocks and claim lines are identified in turquoise 
The Philippines’ blocks and claim lines are identified in pink 
Malaysia’s blocks and claim lines are identified in purple 
Brunei’s block and claim lines are identified in orange 
Indonesia’s blocks and claim lines are identified in dark green139 
 
139  Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative n.d. 
37 
 
APPENDIX 4: A list of historically relevant activity in the South and East China 
Seas from 1974 through 2019 
 
1947: China’s first official claim to the South and East China Sea via an eleven-dash 
line that encompasses the Pratas Islands, the Macclesfield Bank, and the Paracel 
and Spratly Islands 
1951: Treaty of Peace is signed in San Francisco between Japan and forty eight 
countries, ending World War II, Japan concedes its claims to islands in the 
South China Sea and is granted residual sovereignty of them 
1953: The Chinese Communist Party removes the Gulf of Tonkin from the claims to 
simplify them, creating the nine-dash line which China currently claims 
1960: US and Japan sign the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security which the US 
asserts covers South China Sea islands, specifically the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands 
1969: The UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East publishes a report 
identifying credible findings of hydrocarbon resources between Taiwan and 
Japan 
1970: Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan hold East China Sea energy exploration talks, 
China claims sovereignty over nine-dash line, specifically the Diaoyu/Senkaku 
Islands 
1973: Paris Peace Accords, ends US involvement in the Vietnam War 
1974: Chinese forces occupy and plant flags on several western Paracel Islands, 
evicting South Vietnamese Troops and building an airfield and harbor on 
Woody Island 
1976: The Philippines discovers oil in the Northwest Palawan Basin 
1982: The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) defines the 
usage of a nation’s surrounding waters based on exclusive economic zones and 
continental shelves, it is vague with respect to the South and East China Seas 
and has not been ratified 
1987: China establishes a physical presence on Fiery Cross Reef in the Spratlys, 
Vietnam establishes monitoring stations on several nearby reefs 
1988: Seventy-four Vietnamese sailors die when China sinks three Vietnamese vessels 
1992: China passes the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, lays claim 
to all of the South China Sea based on claims dating back to the Xia dynasty 
(21st through 16th centuries BCE) 
1996: Chinese vessels engage with a Philippine navy gunboat in the Mischief Reef, a 
portion of the Spratlys claimed by the Philippines 
1998: China and the United States sign the Military Maritime Consultative Agreement 
to promote a defense dialogue as the PLAN attempts to become a blue water 
navy 
2001: Chinese F-8 interceptor pilot dies in crash with U.S. Navy surveillance aircraft 
over the South China Sea 
2002: Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea is signed between 
ASEAN and China, creates guidelines for conflict resolution 
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2008: Japan and China sign a Joint Energy Development Agreement that covers an 
agreement to explore four oil fields together and includes halting development 
in contested waters 
2009: China begins unilaterally developing the Tianwaitian/Kashi oil field, one of the 
four mentioned in the Joint Energy Development Agreement 
2009: Malaysia and Vietnam request that the UN extend their continental shelves 
beyond 200 miles, China sees this as an infringement on their claims 
2010: Chinese fishing boat collides with a Japanese Coast Guard ship near the 
Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, Japan arrests the crew 
2011: The Philippines expresses concern over at least five incursions by Chinese ships 
near the Spratly Islands and the Palawan Islands. These include: Chinese 
surveillance ships forcing Philippine survey vessel to leave the Reed Bank area 
and harassment of Vietnamese oil exploration ships by China 
April 2012: Chinese fishing boats are confronted by warships from the Philippines near 
the Scarborough Shoal, China responds by dispatching vessels to protect the 
fishermen 
June 2012: Vietnam passes a law claiming jurisdiction over the Spratly and Paracel 
Islands, China responds by establishing a city on the Paracels to administer the 
Paracels, Macclesfield Bank, and Spratlys 
September 10, 2012: Japan buys a portion of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands from private 
owner causing significant protests in China 
September 12, 2012: China claims the territorial sea baselines around the recently 
purchased Diaoyu/Senkaku islands 
January 2013: Under UNCLOS, the Philippines initiates an international arbitration 
case regarding the Chinese claims over the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal, 
China rejects the process and UNCLOS arbitrates without their participation, 
first claim under UNCLOS against China 
May 2013: Japan offers military aid for the Philippine Coast Guard to counter China’s 
presence, this includes patrol boats 
November 2013: Chinese Ministry of Defense creates the East China Sea Air Defense 
Identification Zone covering most of the East China Sea, requires non-
commercial aircraft to submit flight plans before crossing through, South Korea, 
the United States, and Japan all send military aircraft on patrols in the area 
April 2014: US signs a military pact with the Philippines, US expresses support for 
international arbitration of disputed South China Sea Islands 
May 2014: China attempts to establish an oil rig near the Paracel Islands, Vietnam send 
ships to stop the activity, China responds with forty ships for protection, several 
vessels collide 
October: US warships patrol the waters within 12 nautical miles of Chinese built 
Islands in the Spratlys 
February 2016: China deploys missiles on the Woody Islands in the Paracel Islands in 
the South China Sea, claims rights to defend its sovereign territory 
July 2016: The Hague rules against China in the arbitration case under UNCLOS and in 
favor of the Philippines, stating China has no legal basis for the South China 




October 2016: China stations J-11 fighter aircraft on the Woody Islands 
December 2016: China seizes a US scientific underwater drone 
May 2018: Chinese H-6 bombers land on Woody Island 
September 2018: US Destroyer, USS Decatur, narrowly avoids a collision with the 
Chinese Destroyer Lanzhou near the Spratly Islands 
January-March 2019: More than 200 Chinese vessels identified near the Thitu Island in 
the Spratly island chain140 
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